Volume 17
Number 2

Article 2

Winter 12-15-1990

Lewis and Barfield on Imagination
Stephen Thorson

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore
Part of the Children's and Young Adult Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Thorson, Stephen (1990) "Lewis and Barfield on Imagination," Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S.
Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature: Vol. 17: No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol17/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Mythopoeic Society at SWOSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mythlore: A Journal of
J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and
Mythopoeic Literature by an authorized editor of SWOSU
Digital Commons. An ADA compliant document is
available upon request. For more information, please
contact phillip.fitzsimmons@swosu.edu.

To join the Mythopoeic Society go to:
http://www.mythsoc.org/join.htm

Online Summer Seminar 2023
August 5-6, 2023: Fantasy Goes to Hell: Depictions of Hell in Modern Fantasy Texts
https://mythsoc.org/oms/oms-2023.htm

Lewis and Barfield on Imagination
Abstract
Contrasts Lewis’s and Barfield’s views on imagination, and its relationship to truth and knowledge.

Additional Keywords
Anthroposophy and imagination; Barfield, Owen—Epistemology—Imagination; Imagination—Relation to
knowledge; Imagination—Relation to truth; Imagination, Theory of; Lewis,
C.S.—Epistemology—Imagination

This article is available in Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic
Literature: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol17/iss2/2

Issue 64 — (JJlnccR 1990

Page 12

L e m

s

m od

OOyTHLORe

B a rfie ld

on ImmginarloB
Stephen ThoRson
bout 12 years ago, Owen Barfield was asked to speak
on the topic "Lewis, Truth, and Imagination." He com
mented, "

A

How effortlessly Lewis could use his imagination, and
with what success!... [But] the use of the imagination is
one thing: a theory of imagination is another. For a theory
of imagination must concern itself, whether positively or
negatively, with its relation to truth.

Barfield reminded his audience that he and Lewis had had
a "special, and rather protracted, tussle" over that very
question when both were young. This, of course, was their
1920s "Great War," as Lewis called it Surprised by Joy.
Regarding Lewis' view after his conversion, Barfield
commented, "If he no longer denied, as he had done at the
time of the tussle, that imagination had a positive relation
to truth, he was disinclined to give any attention to it." The
implication is that Lewis later accepted a positive relation
ship between imagination and truth. On a different
occasion, however, Barfield has stated flatly that the later
Lewis "held that imagination has nothing to do with
knowledge."1 At first glance these two statements by
Barfield appear to be contradictory. But in fact, both
statements are true. How can this be?
To answer that we must take a closer look at the impor
tance of imagination in Lewis' epistemology: the place of
the imagination in his view of "how we know." A careful
distinction must be made between Lewis' pre-conversion
view during the "Great War" and Lewis' view as it
changed after his conversion to Christianity.
2
In 1924 a poem by Lewis was published in The Beacon.
Lewis titled the poem "Joy," but used the term "Beauty"
interchangably with Joy. It described, of course, that recur
rent transitory experience Lewis called Imagination in his
unpublished Summa and Desire in The Pilgrim's Regress.
"To-day was all unlike another day / ... As I woke. / Like
a huge bird. Joy with the feathery stroke / Of strange
wings brushed me over. Sweeter air / Came never from
dawn's heart." Four lines have special significance for the
discussion at hand.
We do not know the language Beauty speaks,
She has no answer to our questioning,
And ease to pain and truth to one who seeks
I know she never brought and cannot bring.
One cannot find a claerer statement of Lewis' view of
Imagination at the beginning of the "Great War." Beauty

(or Joy, or Imagination) cannot bring truth. Lewis did not
even "know the language Beauty speaks."
Barfield, on the other hand, thought he did know the
language "Beauty speaks." His thesis for the degree of
B. Lift, was all about that language as it was found in
poetry. It was eventually published as Poetic Diction in
1928, but begun as early as 1922. In fact, the arguments in
that book provided the material for much of the "Great
War" debate. The book focused on the very question
Barfield considered so crucial to any theory of imagination
— What is the relation of imagination to truth and
knowledge?

Barfield: Imagination as Knowledge
In Poetic Diction, Barfield limited his attention to
aesthetic experience as found in poetry, calling this poetic
imagination. Barfield defined poetic imagination as a "felt
change of consciousness" (PD, 48), further defining this
change as an "expansion" of consciousness, resulting in
"knowledge" (PD, 55). In poetry, this new knowledge
comes to us through metaphors, which enable us to
recognize "resemblances and analogies," allowing us to
see meaning we could not see before. Barfield believed that
"the poet makes the terms" which carry this new meaning.
He denied that logic or rational thinking could make new
meaning or knowledge; it could only help us become more
aware of the meaning or truth "already implicit in the
words, ... deposited or imported by the poetic activity"
(PD, 31).
Subtitled A Study in Meaning, the book argued for the
essential role of imagination in the creation of meaning.
Language does indeed appear historically as an endless
process of metaphor transforming itself into meaning.
Seeking for material in which to incarnate its last inspira
tion, imagination seizes on a suitable word or phrase,
uses it as a metaphor, and so creates meaning... inspira
tion grasping the hitherto unapprehended, and imagina
tion relating it to the already known. (PD,140-141)

Thus imagination is not only a way or path toward
knowledge, but the only way toward new knowledge of
reality.
In 1929 Barfield read an address before the Lotus Club
at Oxford which was later published as the first essay in
Barfield's Romanticism Comes o f Age. He began with an
assertion that was not only central to this volume of essays,
but to his entire thought regarding poetic imagination —
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that the Romantic Movement never "came of age",
because the English Romantics never developed a
philosophical base for their high view of imagination.3 "To
make Romanticism into a self-sufficient organic being...
there ought to have been added to the new concept,
beauty, to the renewed conception of freedom, a new idea
also of the nature of truth" (RCA, 28). Of course Romantics
such as Shelley and Keats claimed that imagination (poetic
imagination) "bears some special relation to Truth," but
they did not even ask, much less answer, the question: "In
what way is Imagination true?" Even Coleridge, who had
proposed a very high view of Imagination indeed, failed
to complete his philosophical essay on the nature of
Imagination and its relation to truth.

"when it is rai sed to, or nearer to, the level of consciousness
and therewith becomes expressible" (WCT, 77). What
becomes expressible is the organic relation between man and
nature, the "oneness" that truly exists between man and
nature in this philosophical system, a "unity in multeity."

Coleridge's thought about poetry and imagination
became central to Barfield's own views. In his What
Coleridge Thought, one would be hard put to find any major
(or even minor) difference between Barfield and
Coleridge, at least as Barfield has interpreted him.4 In a few
paragraphs it is impossible to do justice to a topic requiring
an entire book by Barfield to explain, but some attempt
must be made. We can simplify matters by limiting our
discussion to the topic of Imagination alone.5

In the preface to the second edition of Poetic Diction
Barfield argued that "as the secondary imagination makes
meaning, so the primary imagination makes 'things'" (PD,
31). During the "Great War" it was the secondary
Imagination, the making of meaning which was in
dispute. What is the nature of this meaning? Can this
meaning show Truth about reality? If so, does it always do
so? And if not always, how can we know when to trust it?

Coleridge distinguished a primary Imagination from a
secondary Imagination. This distinction must be quoted in full:
The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power
and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation
in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I con
sider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the con
scious will, yet still identical with the former in the kind
of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode
of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order
to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible,
yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify,
(quoted in WCT,74)

This certainly is consistent with Barfield's view of
imagination. What may not be clear at this point is that
Lewis also supported this view toward the end of the
"Great War." To see that fact, Coleridge must be under
stood as Barfield interpreted him.
Barfield accepted the view of Being described in the
Lewis' Summa, Part I, i.e. that the soul is projected or emerges
from Spirit, such that each soul can say that it is, at some level,
Spirit. Barfield himself stated, "'I', while remaining one of the
parts, must also be in some sense, the Whole."6 Along with the
subjective soul, however, the world of Nature is also
projected from Spirit. Therefore Lewis had said that the
world also "is the creation of what I, at some level, am"
(Summa, I, xii). Similarly, Coleridge wrote that "of all we see,
hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in oursel
ves" (WCT, 80). For both Coleridge and Barfield the world of
Nature is the unconscious mind of man.7
In this system, then, Coleridge's primary Imagination
actually is this separation of the soul from the world of
Nature around us ("the eternal act of creation"). Normally
this is unconscious. It becomes secondary, Barfield said,

While, then, imagination at its primary stage
empowers experience of an outer world at all, at its secon
dary stage it both expresses and empowers experience of
that outer world as the productive 'unity in multeity,'
which results in a whole and parts organically related to
one another (WCT, 81).

It is this vision of essential oneness between man and the
world of Nature that the Romantics attempted to express,
to re-create, in their work.

In Poetic Diction, Barfield only hinted at the answers to
some of these questions. For example, he noted the
necessity for poets to develop the "presence of mind"
required to judge their visions and words while still
remaining in the imaginative experience (PD, 209). He did
not tell his readers how to develop that "presence of
mind". But he believed that a method was available —
Steiner's Anthroposophical training.
In England Barfield had looked in vain for the
philosophical maturing or the "coming of age" of the
Romantic Movement. In Germany, however, Barfield
found what he was looking for. Steiner had developed
from Goethe a method of knowledge which was, essential
ly, "systematicimagination" (RCA, 37). In Anthroposophy,
Barfield had found a philosophy that included a place for
Imagination, as well as a method for using that Imagina
tion to obtain new knowledge of spiritual reality. And
because all reality is in fact "spiritual," new knowledge of
so-called physical reality can be obtained as well.
There are three stages to the Anthroposophical Way:
Imagination, Inspiration, and Intuition. Considered as the
first stage of Anthroposophical training, Imagination does
not seem precisely the same term as used by Coleridge or
when used by Barfield himself in the term "poetic imagina
tion." This first stage of Steiner's method is a "systematic
imagination," involving concentration and meditation.
Systematic imagination results in a sort of "pictureconsciousness, a vigilant dreaming," which is only a
"semblance of truth". It is only at the second stage of
Inspiration, that "the perceptive faculty itself is enhanced in
a way that begins to have objective value for cognition"
(RCA, 16). During the "Great W ar", Barfield explained to
Lewis that the Poet merely "feels" the truth of a metaphor,
but does not "know" it like the trained Anthroposophist
at the second stage (Replicit, p .ll).
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It is this second stage, and the third, Intuition, that
chiefly interested Barfield, since Steiner claimed that this
method or Way not only resulted in a true knowledge of
reality, but also provided a way to influence that reality.
Barfield had discussed this method with Lewis during the
"Great W ar", noting Steiner's distinction between our
"sensible" awareness and the "super-sensible" awareness
of the trained Anthroposophist. But Lewis rejected out of
hand any belief that seemed to him to be derived from
authority alone. He distrusted the "super-sensible" world
of Steiner, suspecting it was not more "real" than the com
mon phenomenal world, but rather just more phenomena
(and dangerous because it was not recognized as such).
Therefore, most of the "Great War" did not center on
the Anthroposophical Way, but on that experience which
was common to both Barfield and Lewis — that particular
recurrent experience which Lewis called Joy and Barfield
called Poetic Imagination. This was their common ground.

Lewis: Imagination as Spiritual Awareness
While in his teens, Lewis had attempted to believe in
a materialistic world view, which excluded any meaning
ful place for his experiences of Joy, or even of Beauty. He
could not keep denying that Beauty had meaning, how
ever. As he told Greeves in one of this letters at the time,
"I have formulated my equation Matter=Nature=Satan,
and on the other side Beauty, the only spiritual and non
material thing that I have yet found" (TST,214). He in
cluded this concept in his book of poems, Spirits in Bondage,
published in 1919. In the poem, "Song", he said, "Atoms
dead could never thus/ Stir the human heart of us/ Unless
the beauty that we see/ The veil of endless beauty be/..."
(SiB, 51). Lewis had sent this poem to Greeves before its
publication. Commenting on it, he said, "The beauty there
fore is not in the matter at all, but is something purely
spiritual, arising mysteriously out of some indwelling
spirit behind the matter of the tree..." (TST, 217).
At this time Lewis did not always distinguish Beauty
from his transitory experiences of Joy. "The conviction is
gaining ground on me that after all Spirit does exist; and
that we come into contact with the spiritual element by
means of these 'thrills'." He began to believe that "Some
thing right outside time and space" did exist, and that
"Beauty is the call of the spirit in that something to the
spirit in us" (TST, 217).
And yet in Surprised by Joy Lewis made clear that at the
start of his "Great W ar" with Barfield he had retreated
from these vague beliefs. He had become a "realist,"
accepting "as rock-bottom reality the universe revealed by
the senses" (SbJ, 208). Years later Lewis gave Barfield the
credit for a major shift in his thought during their "Great
W ar". Barfield pointed out to Lewis that such "realism"
was inconsistent with his desire to claim that logical
thought led to truth, that moral judgement was objective,
and that aesthetic experience was "valuable."
Notice that Lewis did not end up saying, as Barfield
did, that aesthetic experience leads to knowledge or truth.
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He did not accept Barfield's view of Imagination as a way
toward knowledge. But neither did he wish to accept a
Crocean alternative in which art is completely divorced
from knowledge. He desired to maintain that his
experiences of Joy or poetic imagination were "valuable."
He thought that his new idealist position had provided
him a way to do so, and attempted to convince Barfield in
his Summa. In Part I of the Summa he detailed his view of
Being — (i.e. the evolution of soul from Spirit), but along
the way he made a few comments of importance for his
view of Imagination. In Section x he said, "The analogy
between cosmic and artistic creation is more than an anal
ogy, the latter being simply the lowest grade of the
former." This is straight out of Coleridge's view of primary
and secondary Imagination, of course. Based on this iden
tity in kind between artistic and cosmic creation, he stated
in Section xvii that because God creates by an act of im
agination, God cannot be different than himself. Further,
he wrote that God imagines men's souls and the world
they live in, and that in some sense, he himself actually is
God. Note that for Lewis the term "creation" here meant
an evolution of both soul and the world of Nature from
Spirit. In Section xx, Lewis distinguished two image
making faculties, dismissing Phantasy as a lesser faculty
since it is limited to the material of memory. But Spirit has
no raw material outside itself, and must make an image by
separation of his own substance. Again this echoes
Coleridge (and Barfield) closely (WCT, 75-76).
In Part II, "Value," Lewis settled down to the business
of showing Imagination to be valuable. Although recog
nizing that his view of Being implied that all souls and all
moments must be considered "spiritual," Lewis wished to
keep the word as a useful term of approval for a "higher"
or "better" life. For Lewis becoming more spiritual was a
reawakening or a consciousness of one's participation in
Spirit (Sec. ii). The creation of a resisting matter inevitably
brings pleasure and pain, and therefore the passions. The
Spirit only has a limited view through souls, all of whom
are corrupted by passions. By great struggle, however,
human souls can fulfill their goal to multiply conscious
ness from a diversity of viewpoints to add richness to the
life of the Spirit (Sec. iii). Therefore, "The approximation
of souls to their qualitative equality with the consciousness
of Spirit constitutes their spirituality" (Sec. iv). This is the
primary definition of "spirituality" and was the basis for
his view of Imagination as "Spiritual Awareness," not
knowledge. Even in the 1950's Lewis described his earlier
view of the spiritual life this way. The goal of man was to
"multiply the consciousness of Spirit... while yet
remaining qualitatively the same as Spirit" (SbJ, 225).
Lewis defined two Modes of the Spiritual life. The First
is the Practical Mode, commonly called Virtue or Morality.
The second is the Theoretical Mode, of which there are
many examples. Potentially, each Mode has two stages.
The difference between the two stages is similar to the
difference between Coleridge's primary and secondary
Imagination as Barfield interpreted it, i.e. the secondary
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stage involves an increased consciousness of, and participa
tion in, that which was unconscious at the first stage (WCT,
75-78). He states that the first stage of the Practical Mode is to
will to do right.8 The second stage is to realize that this inner
law of right willing (at first appearing as a command coming
from outside die self) is actually what one really wills at the
deepest level. Thus the second stage involves a hightened
"spirituality", which Lewis had just defined as an
"approximation of souls to their qualitative equality with the
consciousness of Spirit" (Sec. iv). A little later he defined it as
a "conscious participation" in Spirit (Sec. ix).
Lewis ended a lengthy discussion of the Theoretical
Modes of the spiritual life by summarizing: the supreme
mode of the spiritual life must be as universal as Science,
as concrete as History, as disinterested as Art, and as free
from "the great primary abstraction" as Philosophy is. But
it must also, like Charity, consciously cooperate with
Spirit. Is there, he asked, a faculty for seeing any and every
part of our environment as art does unreal objects and
charity does special objects? If so, such a faculty would
fulfill the ideal function of the spiritual life. Souls would
become like clear spectacles for Spirit to see through, and
thus multiply the consciousness of Spirit without corrup
tion (Sec. xi).
Needless to say, Lewis believed there was such a
faculty. After long and careful preparation, Lewis finally
revealed his candidate for the highest mode of the spiritual
life — Imagination.
It may appear to us as a rediscovery, as if we came home
after a long exile: because we are indeed coming to recog
nise that we are Spirit and are everywhere in our own
country and our own house. Or it may appear to us as a
longing which is also fruition, and a losing which is also
keeping, because we then veritably become aware of our
dual nature and our division from ourself, which we are
at once the Spirit that possesses all and the soul that is
abandoning that possession... Others feel that what
seemed dead things are charged with life, and people the
hills and trees with vague personality: nor are they wrong,
for we share the life of the Spirit which knows itself alive
beneath all its vesture. But all alike know that such mo
ments are our highest life. For their continuation would
be the redemption of the world... This highest form of the
spiritual life I call Imagination. (Sec. xiii)

He went on to describe the transitory nature of Im
agination as it is seen in the experiences of mystics, in the
epiphanies described by some, or even in the moments of
insight experienced by philosophers and scientists.
Elsewhere, as we have see, he called these moments, 'Joy."
In a later section of the Summa, Lewis defined Imagina
tion as "the activity of discerning as Spirit" (Sec. xviii). For
the Lewis who wrote the Summa, Imagination meant
Spiritual Awareness. And this Spiritual Awareness was a
consciousness of the soul's oneness with universal Spirit
as well as the soul's oneness with the world of Nature, both
of which are the product of a separative evolution from
that same Spirit. Thus, we see that Lewis' view of
Imagination was based firmly on his view of Being.
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The same cannot be said for his view of knowledge and
truth, however. Shortly before writing his Summa, Lewis
had come across a very important concept. It came to
displace in importance his experience of Joy in the
formulation of his theory of knowledge. He had read in
Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity of Alexander's
distinction between "Enjoyment" and "Contem plation"9
As it is crucial to understand it, I will quote at length Lewis'
discussion of the concept.
When you see a table you "enjoy" the act of seeing and
"contemplate" the table. Later, if you took up Optics and
thought about Seeing itself, you would be contemplating
the seeing and enjoying the thought... I accepted this
distinction at once and have ever since regarded it as an
indispensible tool of thought. A moment later its conse
quences — for me quite catastrophic— began to appear.
It seemed to me self-evident that one essential property
of love, hate, fear, hope, or desire was attention to their
object. In other words, the enjoyment and contemplation
of our inner activities are incompatible... Of course the
two activities can and do alternate with great rapidity;
but they are distinct and incompatible. This was not
merely a logical result of Alexander's analysis, but could
be verified in daily and hourly experience. (Sbf, 217-218)

But I must quote his comments a bit further on.
It followed that all introspection is in one respect mis
leading. In introspection we try to look "inside oursel
ves" and see what is going on. But nearly everything that
was going on a moment before is stopped by the very act
of our turning to look at it. Unfortunately this does not
mean that introspection finds nothing. On the contrary,
it finds precisely what is left behind by the suspension of
all our normal activities; and what is left behind is mainly
mental images and physical sensations. (SbJ, 218)

These two passages are extremely important for our
understanding of Lewis' epistemology. For this concept—
the enjoyment/contemplation distinction — became the
cornerstone for Lewis' theory of knowledge, and Lewis
had incorporated this concept into his view of Being in the
first part of the Summa: "The Spirit is pure subject and can
only be enjoyed, never contemplated" (I,iv). This allowed
him to deny several beliefs of Anthroposophy regarding
communication or travel to other or higher spiritual
worlds, as well as any communication between soul and
Spirit. It also allowed him to deny Barfield's (and
Anthroposophy's) view of Imagination as a path toward
true knowledge. The emphasis of a previous article of mine
was mainly on how this enjoym ent/contem plation
distinction was not consistent with Lewis' view of the
soul's evolution from Spirit.10 Barfield's initial responses
to the Summa tended in that direction. In this article we will
emphasize how Alexander's enjoyment/contemplation
distinction was inconsistent with Lewis' high view of
Imagination.
Almost immediately after his eloquent description of
Imagination (for which Barfield in his Replicit wrote
profusive thanks), Lewis plunged into several more
sections aimed against Anthroposophy. He made good use
of his enjoyment/contemplation distinction. He stated that we
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cannot see spiritually by turning our eyes inward, but only
through turning our eyes outward. We should not strive
to examine our own souls but to enjoy Spirit by con
templating external things, such as the world, art,
philosophy, history, or imagination. Souls that are
introspective are, Lewis felt, in danger of the foolishness
of ascetic practices or its opposite lawlessness, or even
liable to a major reaction like "the dark night of the soul"
described by some mystics. The spiritual life, like Spirit,
must look outward. Since to live spiritually is to see things
as Spirit sees them, not as our passions show them, Lewis
rejected any concern for one's own spiritual life as itself
unspiritual (Sec. xv, xxiv).
Further, he emphasized the disinterestedness which
must be a mark of the spiritual life. He resisted any attempt
to show that any particular thing had "empirical value"
for his life. Value can only arise through an object because
of its relationship with Spirit; attributing that value to the
object itself is Idolatry. Therefore, he wrote that if the
actual existence of heaven and hell, or of the God of the
Christians could be demonstrated, it would become
impossible to consider them in a spiritual way (Sec.xvi).
Lewis regarded Religion as mostly Idolatry mixed with
false opinions about facts. But at times Religion may
actually be Charity with false opinion; in that case,the false
opinions would not take away the spirituality. Even
Charity will cease to be spiritual, however, if it is practised
in deference to a god's external command (Sec.xvii).
Lewis long held that any motive to do right based on
a commandment from without or based on what the doer
would receive in reward was actually unspiritual. This
discussion of Idolatry was important for his attack on
Anthroposophy, since Lewis believed Anthroposophists
to be anything but disinterested; years earlier, he had
suspected that some adherants to Anthroposophy were
attracted by "the sugar plum of promised immortality" or
"comfort." 1 He could not see himself accepting a
philosophy that promised to lead to "supersensible"
knowledge or reality without that acceptance being
tainted with wrong motives (Sbf, 206-207).
The concept of Idolatry also had direct relevance for
Lewis' denial of Imagination as a source of knowledge. For
example, Lewis considered it Idolatry to mistake a myth
or symbol as factually true. For this would be to attribute
empiric value to something which has contingent value.
Imagination ("the activity of discerning as Spirit") does not
need justification, he stated. There can be no reasons from
outside the spiritual itself that can justify it. Value is ab
solute, not empirical (Sec. xviii,xxii).
Lewis proposed that Imagination can take any first
degree mode and convert it into one of the second degree
(i.e. make it more spiritual), but that Art can be
transformed the easiest. "Imagination is par excellence the
content of Art," and Art is "par excellence the vehicle of
imagination." By definition the result is imaginative art,
an art which is consciously spiritual. Imaginative art is
superior because it brings about an actual formation of
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concrete experience, not just a conceptual statement from
that experience (Sec. xix).
Lewis' special interest was imaginative fiction.
Imaginative fiction created consciously by the artist he
called "symbolism," that created unconsciously by a
group or people he called "m yth." Elaborating further,
Lewis noted the relation of symbol and myth to metaphor.
With all three "an experience of one kind [is] expressed,
and enriched, by the supposal or suggestion (not the
actualisation) of an experience of another kind" (Sec. xx).
With the removal of the parenthetical remark, Barfield
himself could have written that definition.
In Sections xx and xxi toward the end of the Summa,
the conflict between Lewis' view of knowledge and his
view of Imagination becomes more obvious. On the one
hand, his claims for Imagination as Spiritual Awareness
were very high. He stated that a poet who experiences a
landscape imaginatively also "consciously cooperates
with Spirit in making that landscape"; such a poet will
naturally use metaphors while recording this spiritual
experience, for "Spirit experiences all things ordered and
articulated in a perfect unity." Spirit perceives the
"absolute relevance... sees no object in isolation." Spirit can
contemplate many things souls cannot, and in their context.
The "suggestion of that context" or rather such "fragments
allowed us by Space and Time... is metaphor," he
proposed. The soul of man caught up in an imaginative
experience (the highest Spiritual experience, remember)
"sees as Spirit sees, wills as Spirit wills." When such a man
returns from his imaginative experience, the remaining
fragments of contexts could become (for him) a myth. So
far so good.
But suddenly, Lewis paused to say that these
fragments of "contextual experience" which become
metaphors "need no experience of the objective world."
They may be mere "subjective fantasies." In some way
these subjective fantasies, as metaphors, allow us to "see
the object more spiritually, that is, more really: but though
they lend reality they do not receive it." The fact that
metaphor makes such imaginative experiences more real
does not prove them to be more than fantasies. Lewis
broke the spell still further by flatly stating, "The existence
of beings used as symbols (e.g. faires, etc.) is therefore to
be handed over to the sciences for empirical inquiry."
After all, truth must be objectively demonstrated.
What is happening? Handing fairies over to scientists
for experimentation? We feel as if a dream has been rudely
interrupted. The disturbance is more than emotional,
however; something has happened to Lewis' argument.
What exactly is left of Lewis' high view of Imagination?
If Spirit perceives "absolute relevance", sees all things
"in perfect unity," then how can anything Spirit sees be
really untrue? A distinction between metaphors
associated with objective truth and those associated with
subjective fantasies seems impossible to uphold — at least
with such a high view of Imagination. Lewis tried to
salvage as much as he could, however. First, he extended
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Spirit's sight a bit. He agreed that we may see oaks more
spiritually if we view them as "green-robed senators" in
Keat's Hyperion. But that is because Spirit sees our fantasies
in addition to the real world, and sees them also "in perfect
unity" (Sec. xx). The metaphor itself does not have to be
true, Lewis said. Although they "lend reality they do not
receive it." Notice that he had been very careful in his
definition of metaphor. Lewis maintained that whatever is
true of imaginatative experience is not what is conveyed in
metaphor, myth, or symbol. At worst they are only the
residue left in the mind after the soul has returned from an
experience of Imagination to a normal state. At best
metaphor, myth, and symbol are only "fragments" or "sug
gestions" of die context and unity which only Spirit sees.
Second, Lewis tried to show, for mythology at least,
that being "untrue" was not a stumbling block, but rather
its essential nature. He insisted again that if beings used as
symbols were shown to actually exist, their symbolical
value would be destroyed.12 For symbols are not given as
facts to us, but taken "by free spiritual activity" (i.e. by
Imagination). If factually true, such beings would be ob
jects of fear or desire, giving them empirical value. They
would need "to be 'disenchanted' i.e stripped of empirical
value and condemned qua worldly terribles or desirables
before they were 're-enchanted' by the spiritual point of
view." Lewis went so far as to say that "if all mythology
were proved as fact, the poets would throw it away and
invent a new one, warranted untrue" (Sec. xxi).
In his Replicit, Barfield attacked both these attempts by
Lewis to make his denial of truth to metaphor consistent
with his high view of Imagination. If Imagination is a
Spiritual Awareness or consciousness of the soul's oneness
with universal Spirit as well as the soul's oneness with the
world of Nature, then how can anything be merely
"subjective"? Barfield pointed out that the universal
"relevance" which all find in Spirit destroys the distinction
between the objective and subjective. At the very least, he
said, subjective fancies becomes objective when given
form and placed in memory. Further, Barfield disputed the
claim that a myth found to be true would be deprived of
symbolic value. He pointed out that this flatly contradicts
Lewis' earlier statement (in Sec. xiii) that during moments
of Imagination Spirit knows itself alive under the vesture
of the natural world. Therefore, the natural vesture can
become symbolic. If Imagination is 'taking7 the symbol,
then the symbol is actually 'taken' by Spirit — and there
fore is also 'given' to the soul. In other words, Lewis' view
of Imagination, based as it was on his view of Being,
implied some sort of reality to all that is experienced via
Imagination.1
In Part I of the Sumtna Lewis was primarily concerned
with establishing his particular idealist view of Being. In
Part II, he was primarily trying to show the pre-eminence
of Imagination in the spiritual life. It is only at the very end
that his denial of truth to metaphor is brought in, seriously
clashing with what he was built up so carefully
beforehand. However, it was this very question of the
truth of metaphor (and Imagination) that had been the
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main point of argument in the "Great W ar" letters.14
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(Part II to be published in the next issue.)
A bbreviations
(All references to Lewis' and Barfield's works in this essay are cited
parenthetically in the text, using the abbreviations listed below.)
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1. The first statement is from Barfield's, "Lewis, Truth, and Imagination,''
Kodon [Wheaton College] (Winter 1978): 17-26. The second is from
Barfield's Postscript to "C.S. Lewis: Sdence-Fiction and Theology,"
by Charles Davy, The Golden Blade 1976; 95-97.
2. Clive Hamilton, "Joy," The Beacon 3.31 (May 1924): 444-445. Clive
Hamilton was Lewis' pen name at the time.
3. For examples, see Barfield's "Either:Or," Imagination and the Spirit, ed.
Charles Huttar (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971) 25-42; and Barfield's
What Coleridge Thought.
4. Barfield attempted to demonstrate through the useof liberal quotes that
many of the philosophical views of C oleridge have been
misunderstood or simply ignored by the vast majority of those com
menting on them.
5. For example, the complicating factor of Coleridge's distinction of
Imagination from Fancy ("a mode of Memory emancipated from the
world of time and space" — WCT, 75) will not be discussed in the text.
Itshould be noted, however, that Fancy for Coleridge was not "crea
tive" of the outer world at all; it remained an "aggregating power; it
combines and aggregates given units of already conscious ex
perience; whereas the secondary imagination 'modifies' the units
themselves" (WCT, 86).
In addition, Fancy and Imagination exist in a polar relationship.
Many, including Barfield himself, might wish for a lengthy discus
sion of Coleridge's concept of polarity in this article. However, that
concept is not a central part of the "Great War" materials themselves.
Barfield did come to see that Lewis' insistence on the enjoyment/
contemplation distinction (related to the "Law of Non-Contradic
tion") could only be overcome by the "imagination of the polarity of
contraries (Coleridge's 'polar logic')"; but in the "Great War"
materials this concept can only be found in Barfield's Autem, written
toward the very end of the dispute. See Barfield's Introduction to
Light on C.S. Lewis, ed. Jocelyn Gibb (New York: Harcourt, 1965).
6. Barfield, De Toto et Parte, "Notes on the Definitions," IV. All quotes from
the "Great War" materials in this article are from previously publish
ed excerpts. Unless stated otherwise, they appear either in my article,
"Knowing and Being in C.S. Lewis' 'Great War' with Owen Barfield,"
CSL: The Bulletin o f the New York C.S. Lewis Society, 169 (Nov.1983),
1-8; or in Lionel Adey's book, C.S.Lewis's "Great War" with Owen
Barfield, English Literary Studies Monograph Series 14 (Victoria, B.C.:
University of Victoria, 1978).
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Commedia: or rather a role. For it is precisely the point of
the story to have Dante the pilgrim (and thus the reader)
so recover a proper vision of the world that he will escape
from it At the beginning of the poem's action (described
in Inferno II, 99 et seq.), it is St. Lucy, the patroness of those
with afflicted sight, who acts as the messenger from the
Blessed Virgin to Beatrice. Dante sees that the human race
has been given that deathlessness for which it always
longed, but he also learns the fairy-story lesson that death
lessness in itself can be, even for Virgil, a torture: and he
sees, we see, how to escape that torture — see it, in this
moment, in the figure of Beatrice, and, in the end, in a flash
beyond the power of fantasy, in an Enchantment of Love
which draws him and us into the Primary Reality.
K

Notes
1. The Comedy of Dante Alighieri the Florentine - Cantica II Purgatory. New
York, Penguin (1955), p. 306.
2. As early as Inferno 1.121-126, where the transition is first adumbrated:
To which glad places, a worthier spirit than I / Must lead thy
steps, if thou desire to come, / With whom I'll leave thee then,
ana say good-bye; / For the Emperor of that high Imperium /
Wills nor that I, once rebel to his crown, / Into that city of His
should lead men home." [Sayers, ...Cantica I H ell... (1949), p.74]
3. e.g., Inferno IV, 76-78; XIII, 52-54; XV, 85; Purgatorio XXI, 85.
4. p. 285. Curiously, Beatrice is not explicitly in voked in Inferno XVI, where
Dante is particularly terrified. She may be represented by some sort
of sequence involving Geryon (Fraud incarnate) and the Siren (who
defrauds by accepting the projection of Dante's own fantasies), as
contrasted with her own, "We are, we are, Beatrice"; or the
mysterious business of the cord with which Dante meant to restrain
the Leopard of incontinent desire may have some sort of reference to
the woman whom (in however courtly a sense) Dante desired.
5. One could argue that Dante is in fact an Orpheus who regains his
Eurydice as well as a Knight who rescues his Lady, in the sense that
what he really quested for was self-knowledge; but despite Virgil's
figurative crowning and mitering — or rather precisely because of
them, as sacramental acts— I think that it would be wrong to conflate
the inner grace of what Dante the pilgrim learns with the outward
signs of what happens to him.
6. The Tolkien Reader, New York: Ballantine 1966), p. 52.
7. Northrop Frye, Sheridan Baker, and George Perkins, The Harper Hand
book to literature, Cambridge: Harper and Row (1985), p. 10.
8. This is probably the point at which to note that Tolkien has been quoted
as condemning Dante's "petty relations with petty people in petty
cities," a remark he made to interviewers from the Daily Telegraph
Magazine. His posthumously published Letters show Tolkien
responding to a draft copy of the interview:
My reference to Dante was outrageous. I do not seriously
dream of being measured against Dante, a supreme poet. At
one time Lewis and 1used to read him to one another. 1was for
awhile a member of the Oxford Dante Society (I think at the
proposal of |C.S.| Lewis, who overestimated greatly my
scholarship in Dante or Italian generally). It remains true that
I found the 'pettiness' that I spoke of a sad blemish in places.
The letters of j.R.R. Tolkien, selected and edited by Humphrey
Carpenter, with the assistance of Christopher Tolkien, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin (1981), p. 377.
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7. What Coleridge Thought, pp. 79-80. One could argue that Barfield inter
preted Coleridge in the most radical sense possible. R.J. Reilly, for
example, in the chapter on Barfield in his Romantic Religion: A Study
of Barfield, Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P,
1972) takesa more "traditional" stance, i.e. Coleridge merely held that
"by means of the Primary Imagination we 'create' the phenomenal
world by our unconscious structuring of the Kantian noumena" (p.
26). Barfield's view is more radical in that there seems to be nothing
but phenomena (or "collective representations"); the "noumena" do
not exist. No physical reality stands behind the phenomena, only
something that could be called the "collective unconscious" (SA,
153-154). Elsewhere Barfield said, "Nature unperceived is the uncon
scious, sleeping being of humanity; just as Nature perceived is the
self-reflection of waking humanity" (RCA, 210).
8. Morality for Lewis was not intrinsically superior to other modes of the
spiritual life, but was "pre-emptive" because it is concerned with
action. Many have tried to trace Lewis' emphasis on morality to his
Christian beliefs. But Lewis had placed morality as one of the highest
modes of the spiritual life well before his Christian conversion. His
acknowledged master in this area was Kant, not Christian revelation.
Lewis stated in Part II of his Summa that a sound theory of ethics, such
as Kant's, implied the metaphysics he had presented in Part I.
9. A recent edition is Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London:
Macmillan, 1966).
10. See my article, "Knowing and Being in C.S. Lewis' 'Great War' with
Owen Barfield," CSL: The Bulletin o f the New York C.S. Lewis Society,
169 (Nov. 1983), 1-8.
10. See my article, "Knowing and Being in C.S. Lewis' 'Great War’ with
Owen Barfield," CSL: The Bulletin o f the New York C.S. Lewis Society,
169 (Nov. 1983), 1-8.
11. Letters, p. 89. After his conversion, Lewis pointed out that he had
begun with no "belief in a future life". "1 now number it among my
greatest mercies that I was permitted for several months, perhaps for
a year, to know God and to attempt obedience without even raising
that question... I have never seen how a preoccupation with that
subject at the outset could fail to corrupt the whole thing" (Sbf, 231).
12. Lewis seems to have never lost his belief that this was true. In his "Is
Theology Poetry?", published in 1945, Lewis said, "In a certain sense
we spoil a mythology for imaginative purposes by believing in it"
(WG, 77). By this time, however, he could caution against going too
far. A believed mythology was spoiled only "in a certain sense", not
in all senses. He admitted that many things we enjoy depend on their
supposed reality in order to achieve their effect on us. Nonetheless,
the kind of pleasure received is different.
13. Symptomatic of the fundamental problems in his argument, Lewis'
distinction between Art and Imagination cannot be maintained. Ear
lier in Part II, Lewis claimed that Art is only an "image" of the spiritual
life because the objects of Art are not "real", and often are mere
"subjective fancies" (Sec. viii). But in the concluding sections of Part
II "subjective fantasies" have been made legitimate objects for Im
agination, although they or their associated metaphors still are
denied "reality" (Sec. xx).
14. The "Great War" letters were for the most part written before the
Summa and the tractates that followed. However, the main point of
disagreement in the letters only appears at the end of the Summa.
Therefore, our examination of the "Great War" letters has been left
till after our examination of Lewis' view of Being and Imagination in
the Summa. This is perfectly consistent with Lewis' own opinion that
metaphysics (the question of Being) is primary.
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